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The Central Asian countries are tied together by geogra-
phy and by history, but both are also the source of much 
of the stress that underscores interstate relations in this 
region. While these states are less than twenty years old 
in their current sovereign status, since the mid-fifteenth 
century relatively stable ethnic communities correspond-
ing to the five titular nationalities have lived in the territory 
that roughly corresponds to the boundaries of what is 
now commonly known as Central Asia.  None of these 
ethnic communities though lived entirely within the 
boundaries of their current states, and all of them com-
peted for access to land and most importantly water, 
without which their economies could not have been sus-
tained.  These geographic links were further cemented 
by over a century and a half of Russian and then Soviet 
rule, which created strong economic interdependencies 
throughout the region, most importantly in the areas of 
energy, the regulation of water usage and of transport. 
There are conflicting views in the international com-
munity as to whether these interdependencies should 
be preserved, redefined, or effectively eliminated, and 
the Central Asian states have conflicting opinions about 
this as well. Each would like to keep those features that 
work to their benefit, and eliminate interconnections that, 
in the minds of their leaders, slow the nation’s economic 
growth. 1 
For Russia and China, Central Asia is a natural 
extension of their own respective territories. Leaders 
in Moscow and Beijing would like to retain and create, 
respectively, interdependencies to better serve their 
own national economic and security needs, and neither 
would like to see the region coalesce in a way that would 
limit their respective freedom of action.  By contrast the 
EU and U.S. would like to redefine the region, to create 
interdependencies with the European energy market, 
and with South Asia, most especially with Afghanistan, 
and both have been seeking to use the resources of the 
1  The author is a senior associate in the Russia/Eurasia Program at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to create new 
transit and energy corridors to serve these ends. 
The international community, though, has found it 
very difficult to launch successful region-wide initiatives, 
in large part because of the long-standing competition 
that exists between many of these countries’ leaders. 
In fact, at various times the competition between these 
men has become so acute, that it looks like some of 
them are more interested in besting each other than 
in solving Central Asia’s pressing challenges.  These 
include managing the region’s shared water supply, 
providing adequate energy supplies to domestic and 
industrial uses, facilitating trade and transport across the 
region, combating transnational security threats, and in 
general managing their shared borders. 
The best expression of the competition is the rivalry 
between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for regional 
leadership, which has colored the personal relationship 
between these countries’ two founding presidents. This 
competition for regional dominance has strong historic 
roots. But more risky are the long-time inter-ethnic rival-
ries that have dominated in the region’s Ferghana Valley.  
These have strained relations between the Uzbeks and 
Tajiks, and Uzbeks and Kyrgyz since independence 
and have periodically left these countries teetering 
on the edge of war. There have also been territorial 
disputes between the Kyrgyz and Tajiks, and strains in 
the Uzbek-Turkmen relationship during much of the rule 
of Turkmenistan’s now deceased founding president 
Saparmurad Niyazov2 (Turkmenbashi).  
In almost all of these instances the competition over 
scarce water resources has served as a trigger when 
relations have deteriorated.  Some of the explanation for 
this lies in the personalities of the presidents, and is at 
least in part, a legacy of Soviet-era personnel practices 
which pitted regional and republic leaders against one 
and another. These differences are further exacerbated 
by the competing economic philosophies that these 
leaders adhere to, with the market orientation of the 














































Kazakhs, the Kyrgyz and the Tajiks being undermined by 
the preference for planned economics by the Uzbeks, 
and to a lesser extent the Turkmen. And into this mix is 
thrown the competing versions of history that each of 
the major ethnic community in the region is advancing to 
enhance the legitimacy of their now nearly twenty year 
old nation states. 
The difficulties in promoting regional solutions 
have frustrated those international institutions charged 
with trying to promote them. It has led them to either 
postpone or downgrade regional projects, such as the 
Central-Asia South-Asia Electricity Market (CASAREM)3, 
that was designed to create a single electricity market 
in South and Central Asia.  It has also hampered the 
promotion of large inter-regional transport projects, as 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan each seek to become the 
regional trade center, deflecting resources which could 
be used to maximize the transport potential and trade 
facilitation across the region. Partly this is because the 
international financial institutions are forced to integrate 
regional projects with country development plans 
drafted in each of these national capitals, and these are 
often rooted in the principles of competition rather than 
cooperation.
There remains an often expressed hope in the 
international community that the politics of rivalry that is 
currently pervasive in Central Asia is a feature of the first 
stage of nation-building, and when the next generation 
of leaders come to power it will be easier to promote 
such projects.  But these states are becoming increas-
ingly more differentiated one from the other. Each is 
creating international partnerships that push them in 
different directions and that will be difficult to dislodge. 
Their competing versions of history are becoming ever 
more deeply engraved in their national consciousness, 
especially since their populations, unlike in the Soviet 
period, now much less frequently have contact with one 
3  For a discussion see ADB Technical Assistance Project, “Preparing the Cen-
tral Asia-South Asia Regional Electricity Market Project”, project 40537, December 2006, 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/REG/40537-REG-TAR.pdf. This project had strong 
support from the World Bank, and the U.S. government was an early and enthusiastic 
advocate
and another, and when they do they may lack a com-
mon language, and so they oftentimes find the contact 
unpleasant, discriminatory, or at least seeming so.
So, it would be wise to at least consider the option that 
with time these regional problems are less, rather than 
more, likely to be solved. And the international com-
munity would do well to consider how best to proceed 
to reduce the likelihood that they will be so further 
exacerbated as to create real “hot” conflict between the 
squabbling parties.
The Causes of these Conflicts:
History and Geography
Many of the conflicts in Central Asia are rooted in the 
history of these ethnic communities, and their com-
petition for preeminence in the region. For nearly two 
millenniums, and until the Russian conquest of the late 
nineteenth century, the political force that controlled the 
lands between Central Asia’s two principal rivers, the 
Syr Darya and Amu Darya, was the dominant power 
in the region, largely because it controlled the region’s 
water source and was able to create an economy that 
was more powerful than the tribal groupings to the north 
(the Kazakhs-Kyrgyz and their predecessors) and to the 
west (the Turkmen).  Since the break-up of the Soviet 
Union Uzbekistan has laid claim to this role, claiming 
that Uzbeks (and not the Tajiks) are the rightful heirs to 
this land, creating concern among the other nationalities 
of Uzbek hegemony4. These fears have been further 
strengthened by how Uzbekistan has defined and 
advanced its national security interests, especially in the 
wake of Tajikistan’s civil war in the early-mid 1990s, and 
the subsequent instability in Afghanistan with its spillover 
effects in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.   
Underlying these disputes is a question of contested 
identity, which nationalities are the “true” heirs to the 
various dynasties which dominated the Central Asian 
region during centuries past. The Uzbeks and Turkmen 
both assert that it was their ancestors who ruled in 









































Khwarazm (Khorezm; Khiva) and who then became the 
Selcuk dynasty. The ruins of old Urgench (Khwarazm’s 
first seat) are on Turkmen territory, while Khorezm, its 
later capital (which was the seat of the Khanate of Khiva), 
is in Uzbekistan. 
This dispute is nothing by comparison to the vary-
ing versions of history constructed by the Tajiks and 
Uzbeks, and the territorial claims that are implied by 
each.  The Tajiks claim to be the exclusive descendants 
of the Samanid Empire, which ruled in the 9th and 10th 
centuries, from its capital in Bukhara.  A statue of the 
dynasty’s founder Ismail (Ibn Ahmad) Samani dominates 
the main square in Tajikistan’s capital, Dushanbe, and a 
picture of his mausoleum (located outside of Bukhara in 
today’s Uzbekistan) is featured on Tajikistan’s currency.  
Not surprisingly, this riles up the Uzbeks, who take 
it as proof of aggressive intent, should the Tajik military 
ever become the match of that of the Uzbeks  They 
view themselves as the true heirs to the lands of the 
Samani dynasty, centering their version of history on 
the person of Amir Timur, and his 14th century dynasty. 
Most historians date the development of the modern 
Uzbek people with the subsequent Shaibanid dynasty 
of the late 15th century. The modern Kazakh nation also 
dates from roughly the same time, and their founder 
Khan Abdul’Kair broke with the Shaibanids and moved 
northward into the Kazakh steppe.  
Both the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs claim to be 
descendants of Chingis Khan or his tribesmen, and 
there has been an uneasy relationship between these 
peoples over the centuries.  Ironically, before the 
Russian conquest in the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, Tashkent was a small, largely Kazakh settlement, 
while many Kazakhs lived (by that time quite unhappily) 
under the rule of the Khan of Kokand (in Uzbekistan’s 
Ferghana Valley). For that reason, fixing the boundaries 
between the two states after independence was quite 
challenging (especially between South Kazakhstan 
oblast and Uzbekistan’s Jizzak oblast). In the end 
Kazakhstan made the decision to cede some of the 
contested land to Uzbekistan during negotiations to 
demarcate their border. This left some small Kazakh 
communities to be transferred to Uzbekistan with some 
Kazakhs forced to relocate5.  Kazakhstan also was will-
ing to give away some small amounts of territory in sev-
eral of its northern oblasts to Russia in order to get that 
border formally delineated in 20056.  By contrast though, 
these were exclusively villages that were populated by 
ethnic Russians and were bisected by the administrative 
boundaries of the U.S.S.R. 
Border management between Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan was a serious problem throughout President 
Saparmurad Niyazov’s lifetime, although progress has 
been made with regard to joint management since 
President Gurbangoly Berdimuhammedov has come 
to power7.  The persistence of small ethno-national 
enclaves means that boundary issues along the Kyrgyz-
Tajik, the Tajik-Uzbek and the Kyrgyz-Uzbek borders 
remain virtually but not yet fully resolved. There are 
ethnic enclaves in all three countries (tiny bits of territory 
belonging to Tajikistan surrounded on all sides by Kyrgyz 
territory, and similar bits of Kyrgyzstan in Tajikistan, and 
the same is the case with stranded Uzbek and Kyrgyz 
territories in one and another’s states)8.  Their fate has 
yet to finally be decided, and there are contentious bits 
along the Tajik-Uzbek, Kyrgyz-Uzbek and Kyrgyz-Tajik 
borders.  There have been small violent skirmishes 
in border areas over water between Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. The Uzbeks mined their border with the 
Tajiks9,  following bombings in Uzbekistan in 1999, which 
the Uzbeks blamed on small terrorist bands (of the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the IMU10) who they 
5  Igor Rotar, Uzbekistan Bulldozes Settlements Along Border With Kazakh-
stan” Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 2 Issue: 9, January 12, 2005, http://www.jamestown.
org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=27369.
6  It took 4 more years for border markings to begin to appear. RIA Novosti 
Russia, “Kazakhstan to mark vast shared border,” April 30, 2009, http://en.rian.ru/rus-
sia/20090430/121393916.html.
7  See OSI, “Turkmenistan News Brief,” issue 11, 2008, March 7-13, 2008, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/turkmenistan/newsarchive/english_20080313.pdf 
and CA News, “Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan approve a number of agreements,” Novem-
ber 16, 2009, http://74.125.93.132/search?q=cache:6D0KVfERRGYJ:en.ca-news.org/ne
ws/113191+uzbek+turkmen+border+agreement&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
8  See Appendix B for a map showing these enclaves.
9  RFE/RL, “Central Asian Countries Seek to Determine Border Areas” Spero 
News, November 22, 2009, http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?id=23056&t=Ce
ntral+Asian+Countries+Seek+To+Demine+Border+Areas.








































claimed transited across Tajikistan11.  The demining of 
the border, despite the loss of life and livestock, has yet 
to be completed.12  The Uzbek-Kyrgyz border was never 
laid with mines, but after some small terrorist incursions 
on the Uzbek side, in 2009 the Uzbeks began digging 
ditches along their part of the border and reduced the 
number of legal crossing points.  The Uzbeks and Tajiks 
require visas of one and another, and the Uzbeks and 
Kyrgyz also maintained a visa regime for nearly a dec-
ade, suspending it effective February 2007.
The old Soviet administrative boundaries were drawn 
(and periodically redrawn) with little attention to respect-
ing the ethnic divisions of the affected populations. 
Many western scholars (and now the Central Asians 
themselves) claim that national demarcation was initially 
done by Stalin to prevent the people of what was then 
known as Turkestan from unifying and seceding, but the 
population of this region was far from ethnically unified, 
and was unable to come together during the years of 
the Russian Revolution and Bolshevik Civil War (1917-
1922), when serious efforts to create independent states 
occurred in the Baltic region, in Ukraine, and in Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan.
  Whatever the motivation, the very messi-
est division of territory occurred in the territory of the 
Khanate of Kokand, which fell under Russian control 
in the late 1860. This khanate had broken off from the 
Emirate of Bukhara some hundred-plus years previ-
ously, and controlled the entire Ferghana Valley, which 
was divided between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan (the area 
around Khujand) and Kyrgyzstan (Osh and Jellalabad), 
Namangani and Tahir Yuldashev, who gathered young Islamists from the Ferghana Valley, 
many of whom were followers of a fundamentalist cleric from Andijian (Abduhvali qari 
[Vasaev]  and went to Tajikistan to fight with the Islamic opposition there. They remained 
in Tajikistan until 1998, then moved to Afghanistan, where they established camps that 
were funded by al-Qaeda.  These camps were destroyed during the ISAF (NATO) bombing 
campaign of 2002, and the surviving forces joined up with Afghan opposition and moved 
to western Pakistan, where Tahir Yuldashev was reportedly killed in late 2009.
11  For a brief discussion of the 1999 events and a concise description of 
Uzbekistan’s security situation see Jim Nichol, “Uzbekistan Recent Developments and US 
Interest” Congressional Research Service, RS21238 Updated August 27, 2008, http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21238.pdf.
12  Tajikistan also has mines left from the Civil War, and along the Tajik-Afghan 
border, for a full discussion of Tajik demining efforts see, Tajikistan Mine Action Center, 
“2006 Mine Action in Tajikistan,” http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/
mbc/IWP/SC_april07/speeches-mc/Tajikistan-25April2007slides.pdf.
with Uzbeks and Tajiks living in the former two regions 
and Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the latter.  Whatever the 
punitive reasons behind this decision might have been, 
it did enable each of these three republics to have some 
arable land, on which among other things, cotton could 
be grown.  This crop was also planted on that part of the 
territory of Kokand that went to Kazakhstan (current-day 
Jambyl and South Kazakhstan oblasts).  And through-
out most of Soviet rule, these parts of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were run as sub-fiefdoms 
of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, increasing 
Tashkent’s hunger to regain control (even if only indirect) 
of this territory. 
 As one can see from the maps provided in the 
appendix to this text, present-day Uzbekistan, cursed 
now by being the region’s (and one of the world’s two) 
only doubly land-locked countries, was during Soviet 
times at the center of most of the transportation and 
communication that served the region13.  For that reason 
it still can create a stranglehold over land based trade 
going from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and railroad traffic 
from these countries as well as from Turkmenistan.  
Uzbekistan also played a key role in the supply 
of energy and water to the entire region. The CAC 
(Central Asian Center) gas pipeline system crisscrossed 
Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan’s gas passed through western 
Uzbekistan and then through Kazakhstan to Russia, 
while Uzbekistan supplied southern Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with gas, which was used for 
heating and electricity in all three countries14.  There 
was a unified electricity grid (created in the 1970s, 
which lasted until November 2009), and water released 
from large dams upstream in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
produced electricity in summer, as well as the water for 
irrigated agriculture that all of these states (but most 
especially Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) depended 
upon. The region’s water regulation authority was also 
located in Tashkent, and it controlled the timing and 
amounts of water released for distribution to all five 
13  See Appendix C.








































states (northern and central Kazakhstan was largely 
served from the Siberian water basin). 
Uzbekistan was also the home of the Turkestan 
Military District, which was the Soviet Army’s largest 
military facility in the region, and which commanded 
the military detachments in the other four Central Asian 
republics (briefly, during the war in Afghanistan there was 
a Central Asian military district created in Kazakhstan). 
So when the U.S.S.R. dissolved, Uzbekistan inherited 
the largest (over eighty thousand men in arms) and best 
equipped military in the region, and also the air defense 
command system for the U.S.S.R.’s southernmost bor-
ders. And Uzbekistan was the first state in the region to 
begin working closely with NATO to begin the reforma-
tion and rearming of those forces that they inherited. The 
country also has a very well developed internal security 
force, of some twenty thousand, dating from Soviet 
times, which further has exacerbated the nervousness of 
Uzbekistan’s neighbors.
Tajikistan’s Civil War
The Civil War in Tajikistan served as a further stimulus for 
Uzbekistan to transform itself into a security state, and 
from the very earliest days of independence undermined 
the prospects of regional cooperation, as well as seri-
ously undermining Tajikistan’s own economy.  
There is considerable literature on the causes, 
conduct and impact of the war, whose most violent 
phase occurred in 1992-1993 (regular clashes between 
armed bands, militias and armies in most of southern 
Tajikistan), and periodic skirmishes from 1993-1997, 
when an agreement on national conciliation was signed 
between the government, headed by President Imamali 
Rahmon (head of state since December 1992, and first 
elected president in 1994) and the opposition forces 
(known as the UTO, United Tajik Opposition, which 
included the Islamic Renaissance Party, Central Asia’s 
only legal Islamic party)15.  However armed Islamic ter-
15  For details on the Tajik Civil War and the subsequent period in Tajik history 
see International Crisis Group, “Tajikistan An Uncertain Peace,” December 2001, http://
www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400521_24122001.pdf.
rorist groups, including fighters from the IMU, continued 
to live and train in Tajikistan (in the Tavildar region) until 
1998 when, after continued pressure from Uzbekistan 
(which had provided safe haven for some of Imamali 
Rahmon’s non-Islamic enemies) they were relocated in 
Afghanistan. Even afterwards, small bands of the IMU 
were able to transit across Tajikistan, and in 1999, and 
2000, they took hostages in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken region, 
holding them for ransom. Once again in 2008 and 2009, 
Uzbek authorities began to complain that Tajikistan 
(as well as Kyrgyzstan) was providing a safe-haven for 
armed formations of Uzbek Islamists.
For this reason Uzbekistan initially effectively closed 
its border with Tajikistan for the entire duration of the 
Civil War, creating year-round highways to link Tashkent 
across the mountain passes that separated it from 
mountains with the Ferghana Valley, bypassing the 
Soviet-era highways that went along the valleys and 
through Tajikistan’s Sugd (Khujand) oblast. Since the 
opening of these new roads, Tashkent has felt quite 
comfortable keeping a tight regime on the Uzbek-Tajik 
border, which is applied to all commercial traffic that lack 
international transport (TIR16) certification, a convention 
which Tajikistan has never joined. This has substantially 
increased the cost of importing goods for Tajikistan, 
as the Tajiks are forced to move most of their freight 
through Tajikistan, or China. These routes are longer, 
and despite substantial expansion and refurbishing 
of transit routes at international expense, they remain 
difficult to use in winter because of the high mountain 
passes they traverse17. The de facto closure of the Tajik-
Uzbek border made Tajikistan more dependent upon 
costly air freight and has effectively destroyed family fruit 
and vegetable farms in Katlon oblast in Tajikistan (where 
in particular their unusual orange-yellow lemons grew, 
16  The TIR convention for international transport dates from 1975, and was 
developed under the auspices of the UNECE, the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe to regulate international highway travel. See http://www.unece.org/tir/hand-
book/english/newtirhand/TIR-6Rev2EN_Convention.pdf.
17  Several of these projects are supported by CAREC (Central Asian Regional 
Economic Cooperation program of the ADB). For a discussion of their six economic coop-










































which were sold in Russia as a delicacy). Now some of 
these farms have been turned over to agro-business 
interests from the Gulf states. For the entire course of 
the Civil War agricultural productivity dropped dramati-
cally, as did industrial output in most of the country 
(except Sugd oblast in the north where there was very 
little fighting). Among the many losses during this period 
was the accidental destruction of the dam being built 
in Rogun to support the new hydroelectric station, a 
project begun by the Soviets, and which was only a few 
years away from completion when the war began. 
Tajikistan’s Civil War also had a serious effect on 
Kyrgyzstan’s economy. Uzbekistan’s belief that Kyrgyz 
authorities failed to control their borders adequately 
led the Uzbeks to close their borders with Kyrgyzstan. 
The closure of these borders created strong incentives 
for the development of southern Kyrgyzstan, as Uzbek 
capital crossed the border to relatives in Kyrgyzstan. 
But it also increased Kyrgyz interdependence with 
Kazakhstan with rapid increases in Kazakh invest-
ments in Kyrgyzstan, which created dislocations during 
Kazakhstan’s banking crisis of 2006-2008. The Kyrgyz 
decision to enter the WTO early (in 1998) speeded up 
what would inevitably have been a growing interdepend-
ence with China.
Competing Leadership Styles 
and Economic Philosophies
The bickering between the Central Asian presidents 
developed almost immediately following independ-
ence, and was stimulated in part by the circumstances 
of Tajikistan’s Civil War, which broke out after former 
Tajik communist party head Rahmon Nabiev seized 
power in September 1991. Nabiev’s inability to control 
the situation was not well tolerated by the former 
communist party leaders (Karimov, Nazarbayev and 
Niyazov) who ran the neighboring countries18,  and who 
18  In the first years of independence Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan, who had 
come to power in 1990, was the only head of state who had not headed a republic 
communist party.  He was a physicist who had spent his career in the Communist Party 
supervising the educational establishment, and was ousted from power in March 2005, 
gathered regularly (frequently under the auspices of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] with 
Russia’s participation).  
Niyazov quickly began to absent himself from 
various gatherings, and in 1994 announced that his 
country’s foreign policy would follow the doctrine of 
“positive neutrality” that he developed and had for-
mally recognized by the United Nations, which limits 
Turkmenistan’s international engagement even under his 
successor. While Turkmenistan remains a member of the 
CIS, it never joined the various customs unions which 
Russia has sought to introduce, it is not a member of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), nor the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)19,  nor 
EurAsEC20  (the Eurasian Economic Community).
Turkmenistan’s absence has hampered the function-
ing of the latter two organizations, as it leaves the com-
petition for regional dominance and global recognition 
between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan more exposed.  
The rivalry between the founding presidents of these 
two countries is as keen today as it was between their 
respective ancestors when these ethnic communities 
became differentiated some six hundred fifty years ago. 
Islam Karimov and Nursultan Nazarbayev each 
thinks of himself as extraordinarily talented and each 
believes that he has the weight of history on his nation’s 
side. Karimov considers Uzbekistan to be Central Asia’s 
heart, while Nazarbayev sees himself as sitting astride 
a country which unites Europe with Asia. In general 
Uzbeks consider themselves as representatives of a 
world class civilization, a center of the Islamic civiliza-
tion and an outpost of the ancient Greeks before that, 
while the Kazakhs maintain that their nomadic traditions 
replaced by Kurmanbek Bakiev.
19  The Collective Security Treaty Organization was formed in 2002, replacing 
the collective security treaty provisions of the CIS. Its 7 members are Russia, Armenia, 
Belarus, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Russia.  Uzbekistan joined in 2006, but 
limited its participation in 2009. The organization’s website is in Russian, and offers a 
pretty account of the organization’s activities and documentation. See http://www.dkb.
gov.ru/.
20  EurAsEc was formed in 2000, with the founding membership of Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Belarus, and Russia. Uzbekistan joined in 2006, and became 
inactive in 2008. http://www.evrazes.com/en/about/ and http://www.evrazes.com/.
EurAsEc replaced the Central Asian Economic community, which did not include Russia 









































present an exemplary form of tribal democracy upon 
which a modern democracy can eventually be created. 
 Each believes that his education and background 
offers ideal preparation for the tasks they face as presi-
dent. Both men were appointed by Mikhail Gorbachev to 
head their respective republics in June 1989. Karimov, 
a trained economist, spent most of his career in 
Uzbekistan’s branch of Gosplan, the USSR’s state plan-
ning agency, before serving as an oblast party secretary 
(in Kashka Darya). Nazarbayev served as his republic’s 
prime minister before his appointment as Kazakhstan’s 
party chief (and head), and in the months before the col-
lapse of the USSR was being courted by Gorbachev to 
serve as prime minister of the USSR.
The personal rivalry has made it more difficult for 
close relations to develop between the two states.  
Summits of presidents, and foreign ministers, or regu-
larly scheduled meetings of multilateral organizations 
aside, it is rare for the Uzbek government to send large 
delegations to important meetings that are held in 
Kazakhstan or in any of the other national capitals.  And 
not surprisingly the leaders of the other countries don’t 
have much interest in de facto acceding to Tashkent’s 
superiority by gathering there or accepting Uzbekistan’s 
position whenever practical matters are being dis-
cussed. In fact, it seems that the opposite is often the 
case. Even when Tashkent makes a practical sugges-
tion, those in the other Central Asian capitals often view 
it with some suspicion almost by definition.
There have been periods of greater and lesser 
rapprochement between the two leaders and coun-
tries; unfortunately the last year or so has been a time 
of relative tension.  Karimov seems to have taken 
personal umbrage at a statement by Nazarbayev that 
Uzbekistan’s full participation in a Central Asian eco-
nomic union would help solve that country’s economic 
problems.  This led Karimov to upbraid Nazarbayev in a 
press conference that was broadcast live on Kazakh tel-
evision, telling him that the Uzbeks were capable of solv-
ing their own problems21.  Moreover, Karimov appears 
21  This was reported to me during my visit to Almaty in April 2008.  For an 
to see Kazakhstan’s current financial crisis as something 
of a just reward for accepting “international meddling” 
and for the hubris he believes Nazarbayev showed in 
his setting his country on “the road to Europe,” and by 
moving Kazakhstan relatively quickly toward a largely 
market-based economy. 
The differing economic choices made by these 
two countries, and explicitly by their two leaders is one 
of the major sources of tension between the Uzbeks 
and Kazakhs, as well as between the Uzbeks and 
their other Central Asian neighbors. By the mid-1990s 
Kazakhstan was cooperating with the IFIs and set firmly 
on the course of introducing market conditions into its 
increasingly privatized economy, while the Uzbeks were 
deciding to stop pursuing the financial stabilization pro-
gram that they had worked out with the IMF. While the 
Kazakhs were introducing some transparency into the 
management of state-held assets (such as the national 
oil company KazMunaiGaz) by beginning public trading, 
and transferring the state shares to Samruk-Kazyna22  
(a holding company which included foreign managers) 
Uzbekistan preserved state ownership of most natural 
resources, a state procurement system for cotton, and 
subsidized pricing for basic foodstuffs.  These price 
supports were another reason for Uzbekistan’s unwilling-
ness to join any sort of remotely free-trade regime, 
because even with tight controls Uzbek citizens found 
ways to sell their cheap foodstuffs in their neighbors’ 
markets. An open trade regime would have made it 
impossible to preserve these subsidies, and this would 
have threatened the Uzbek government’s strategy for 
maintaining social stability, which was its overriding 
domestic political goal. 
These differences in policy, combined with the 
size of the Kazakh economy more than five times that 
of the region’s smaller states’, has made Kazakhstan 
a much more significant economic presence in the 
account of the visit more generally see Erica Marat, “Karimov, Bakiev React Differently 
to Nazarbayev’s Central Asian Union” Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 5 Issue: 79 April 24, 
2008. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33582.
22  For a description of Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund and 









































region. Before the current global economic crisis Kazakh 
capital had found a niche in each of the other Central 
Asian countries, including in Uzbekistan. With the onset 
of the crisis Kazakh investors got rather summarily 
ejected from Uzbekistan after Kazakhstan began to 
send Uzbek seasonal workers home when the country’s 
construction market began drying up in mid-2008, 
and as agriculture also began to contract (as the effect 
from high energy costs and relatively lower food prices 
continued to be felt).  In general, unlike Islam Karimov, 
Nursultan Nazarbayev has maintained the respect of his 
fellow leaders from Central Asia, but his relations with 
Kyrgyzstan’s Kurmanbek Bakiyev now seem somewhat 
strained, given the failure of some Kazakh-Kyrgyz 
joint ventures during the current economic crisis, and 
Kyrgyzstan’s increasing dependence on subsidized 
energy from Kazakhstan. Tajikistan’s Imomali Rahmon 
is still happy to receive humanitarian assistance from 
Astana. Turkmenistan’s Gurbangoly Berdimuhammedov 
is much closer to Nazarbayev than was his predecessor 
and the Kazakhs are now a visible economic pres-
ence in Turkmenistan more than any time in the past. 
But Berdimuhammedov has no interest in viewing 
Nazarbayev as a “big brother,” and has shown no partic-
ular interest in coordinating Turkmenistan’s energy policy 
with that of Kazakhstan, something that the Kazakh 
leadership had hoped would be possible during the early 
days of Berdimuhammedov’s presidency.     
Lack of Cooperation in the 
Water-Energy Nexus
One of the consequences of the atmosphere of com-
petition that pervades in Central Asia has been the near 
impossibility of creating any sort of long-term resolution 
to the challenge of managing the region’s water system, 
which is intricately tied to the energy security of several 
of these countries, and the water security of all the 
others. So far, no one in the international community 
has been able to create an environment conducive to 
resolving the future management of the region’s water 
and hydroelectric nexus, which is explained in detail in a 
2004 World Bank report23.   
The region’s former nomads (Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and 
Turkmen) have long competed for economic primacy 
with those from the agriculturally-based oasis cities 
(Tajiks and Uzbeks), and for thousands of years their 
disputes have largely focused on water, who controls it 
and how it should be used. In the old days the nomads 
claimed rights of free use of the water (and pasturage) 
they encountered as they drove their cattle, sometimes 
clashing with other nomads, and almost always were at 
odds with the oasis communities who sought to manage 
the water flows to support irrigated agriculture.
Today the divisions on the water question are 
somewhat different; downstream countries (Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan and southern Kazakhstan) need the water 
for agricultural usage, and the upstream providers 
(Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) want to use the water for 
producing energy for export and for domestic use. In 
upstream and downstream countries there are huge 
inefficiencies in the use of water and in the distribution 
of electricity, inefficiencies which the feuding countries 
point out about each other when complaints are made 
that water is in short supply, or that gas bills are too 
high.
During the Soviet period there was a regional water-
management system, based in Tashkent that regulated 
the release and allocation of water, which was critical to 
sustain the highly water-intensive cotton economy. It was 
so important that Moscow had several dam projects 
(Kambarata in Kyrgyz Republic and Rogun in Tajikistan, 
in particular) that were designed to extend the water 
cascade system that supported irrigation and sum-
mertime electricity production24,  in order to support the 
expansion of the cotton industry. With independence the 
economic rationale for the system was lost, or at least 
certainly transformed, because of the competing needs 
23  World Bank, “Water-Energy Nexus: Improving Regional Cooperation in the 
Syr Darya Basin,” January 2004, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTUZBEKISTAN/
Resources/Water_Energy_Nexus_final.pdf.
24  See Appendix E for a map of Central Asia’s cascades and hydroelectric 








































of each of the new countries. But there was no longer 
any recognized authority to regulate water, let alone 
figure out how to calculate the comparative values of 
water and energy so that they could work to the mutual 
advantage of all of the states concerned. Upstream pro-
ducers argue that if they are going to continue to operate 
their hydroelectric stations under an “irrigation” routine 
rather than for hydroelectric production year-round then 
they should be compensated for their loss of cheap 
energy that year-round operation of the hydroelectric 
stations would produce25.  (This leaves aside the ques-
tion of whether the existing water supply would suffice 
for such operation without the creation of new dams 
linked to hydroelectric stations further upstream such as 
Kambarata and Rogun.) 
Under the Soviet system, water had never  been 
paid for, hydroelectric power had been “sold” by the 
state for entirely arbitrary prices, which were little more 
than records on ledger books that formed the basis 
of inter-republic transfers, and the cost of the water 
management system had been born by Moscow. While 
there had always been competing interests between 
the republics---everyone wanted enough water to get 
bumper cotton crops, and to be the first to do so---, 
none of this was translated to obligations of the leaders 
before their populations.
After independence Central Asia’s leaders were 
heads of states, and as a result had very different 
responsibilities to their populations and no longer had 
Moscow to serve as controller and buffer. Everyone 
wanted more water, to grow food crops as well as to try 
and increase their export income. All of the countries 
also needed to find money to pay for energy imports, 
initially from Moscow but then increasingly from one and 
another, given that independence created multiple own-
ers of the interdependent electricity and gas systems. 
With time these interdependencies are beginning to 
become undone, but in ways that are increasing regional 
competition, rather than reducing it. This is occurring 
25  See Appendix F from 2004 World Bank report that shows the value of 
Kyrgyzstan’s loss by virtue of running its hydroelectric stations on an irrigation regime.
despite various efforts of international mediation to try 
and introduce a single water management system, and 
to assist the poorer states in the region (Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan) to develop their hydroelectric potential.  
There have been a series of interstate agreements 
negotiated since the collapse of the Soviet Union to reg-
ulate various segments of Central Asia’s water system26,  
including the 1992 agreement which set up the Interstate 
Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC)27.  These 
have often not been negotiated in a timely fashion, leav-
ing downstream users with no guarantee that they would 
get enough water for spring and summer plantings. The 
principle of payment for water has never been accepted 
by Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, but Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan have worked out an arrangement for the 
management of the Chu and Talas rivers, through a bi-
national commission by which Kazakhstan helps meet 
the cost of maintaining Kyrgyzstan’s reservoir system 
as it pertains to these two joint waterways28.  For many 
years the Uzbek acquiescence to the need to help pay 
towards the costs of the Toktogul reservoir (upon which 
their water supply was heavily dependent) was implicitly 
contained in the way the barter arrangement for gas 
payments was worked out between the two countries. 
But even before gas prices began their rapid price rise, 
some five years ago, both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan tried 
to reduce their dependency on Uzbek gas by producing 
more electricity in winter, which Uzbekistan then blamed 
for unusually severe spring flooding, and the Uzbeks 
blame both the Kyrgyz and the Tajiks for the subsequent 
drop in reservoir water levels.
While each of the Central Asian countries has 
made some progress towards reforming their electricity 
sector, prices for electricity to domestic and industrial 
26  See Appendix G for a list of these agreements, drawn from the water wiki 
net project.  See http://waterwiki.net/index.php/Central_Asia for general materials and 
http://waterwiki.net/index.php/Situation_in_Central_Asia#Review_of_CAR_countries.27_
policy_toward_Water_Governance for a detailed description of the governance structures.
27  There website includes the founding documents and the water laws of the 
various Central Asian countries. See http://www.icwc-aral.uz/.
28  The commission has been in existence since 2000 and maintains a web-
site of its activities in English and slightly more information in Russian.  See http://www.









































consumers have gone up far more slowly than have 
global prices for gas. Russia was willing to turn over part 
of this increase to Uzbekistan, offering them $305 per 
1000 cubic meters in 200929,  which was nearly twice 
what either Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan had been charged 
the previous year, when both were already balking over 
what they viewed as Uzbekistan’s unfair gas tariffs. In 
return both cut back on gas purchases. Unfortunately, 
2007-2008 was an especially cold winter, and the energy 
cutbacks that were introduced in both Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan increased the general popular sense of ill-will 
toward the Uzbeks. Ironically, the Uzbeks also have 
introduced electricity brownouts in winter time for their 
own population. These too have frequently been blamed 
on the neighbors using too much water for electricity 
generation, but since only 20 percent of Uzbekistan’s 
electricity comes from hydroelectric power, with gas 
largely accounting for the rest, the electricity shortages 
are also reflecting the underpriced domestic electricity 
market.
The Uzbeks are simply able to get a better price by 
exporting their gas outside of the region than by selling 
it to their immediate neighbors or even to their own 
population.  Moreover, this price differential is not likely 
to lessen significantly any time soon, and the opening of 
the market in Afghanistan for both Uzbek electricity and 
potentially for Uzbek gas as well, is already causing fur-
ther dislocations in the Central Asian energy market. In 
November 2008 Uzbekistan announced that they were 
dropping out of the Central Asian electricity grid, and 
then Kazakhstan said that they too would leave, rather 
than assume responsibility for coordinating transmis-
sions to the neighboring countries, or providing electric-
ity that was not being paid for. While the grid was not 
supposed to be decoupled until December 1, 2009, on 
November 10 Tajikistan suffered the nearly complete clo-
sure of its electricity system, as a result of Uzbekistan’s 
premature uncoupling of the electricity relays30. 
29  Vladimir Socor, “Russia Strengthening Its Monopoly on Uzbek Gas,” 
Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 16, January 26, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/
single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34413.
30  Gulnara Toralieva, “Power Struggle Threatens Central Asia Power Grid,” 
For a while it looked like economic reconstruction 
efforts in Afghanistan would lead to the international 
investment to complete the Kambarata and Rogun 
hydroelectric dams in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan respec-
tively.  But plans for creating a single electricity market 
in Central and South Asia (CASAREM) were slowed 
down by 2008, when the security situation in both 
Afghanistan and Pakistan began to deteriorate, and 
further worsened in 2009. The environment of regional 
and geopolitical competition also made these projects 
seem riskier to the international community. In 2007 
when the interest of the international financial institu-
tions in loaning money for completing the abandoned 
Soviet-era hydroelectric projects was piqued the Tajiks, 
and to a lesser extent the Kyrgyz, set up something of 
a bidding war, with both countries backing away from 
plans that the Russian industrialists and RAO UES (the 
Russian energy monopoly) were supporting. This led to 
some strains in Russia’s relationship with both countries, 
most particularly Tajikistan, and created an impression 
in some quarters that the Kremlin was seeking to under-
mine the IFIs’ strategy for Afghan recovery, at least so 
far as it meant creating alternative energy and transport 
corridors to that of Russia. The Uzbeks also began to 
actively campaign against the projects, demanding inter-
national assurances that their water security would not 
be adversely affected, and making it more difficult than 
ever for the IFIs to work in their country.
There has been a positive side to the IFIs backing 
away from immediate support of the CASAREM strategy, 
which is that more attention is being paid to projects that 
will create short and medium term relief of Tajikistan’s 
and Kyrgyzstan’s energy shortages, to repairing and 
modernizing the existing electricity generating stations, 
and to reform the electricity industry and its tariff struc-
ture. Although the pace of industry reform is still behind 
that of increasing generating capacity, it nonetheless 
increases that prospect that when and if the large hydro-
electric stations do get constructed the excess capacity 









































would be able to be diverted more to export (and hence 
produce more revenue) than would otherwise have been 
the case.
But the risks to regional security that are associated 
with the large hydro projects remain.  The Tajiks have 
begun trying to complete Rogun with their own funding, 
vowing that even if it takes a decade, they will begin 
closing off the Vahsh River to dam it in spring 2010, 
which is sure to disturb the spring flow and, at least for 
now, could leave the downstream reservoirs short of 
water. The World Bank is currently trying to negotiate 
with the Tajiks and Uzbeks to create an international 
consortium (including all affected parties) that would 
share in the planning and operation of the project, and in 
return international funding would be made available for 
it. Russia angered the Tajiks by promising that any fund-
ing for hydroelectric stations would have to meet with 
the approval of all the affected parties, and then got the 
Uzbeks mad by promising to fund the construction of 
Kyrgyzstan’s Kambarata project, when Bishkek was pre-
paring to close the NATO base at Manas. While a new 
agreement was reached between Bishkek, the Russians 
are still promising the funding for the construction of 
Kambarata (in return for a majority interest in the project), 
albeit more slowly than the Kyrgyz had hoped for. 
The Consequences of These Conflicts: 
Central Asian States Remain Vulnerable 
to Being Played Off Against Each Other
As a result of the environment of competition in Central 
Asian these states have not been able to maximize 
their collective bargaining power, to better manage their 
relations with both Russia and China. Instead, Russia in 
particular has been able to play these states off against 
one and another, increasing tensions in the region and 
to advance the idea that only Russia can serve as a 
stabilizer in the region.  
To some degree the SCO has helped the Central 
Asian states collectively manage their relations with 
both of these large powers, and to use China to better 
insulate them from Russia. But, as a former foreign min-
ister of Tajikistan once confided, they have not managed 
to do this to the extent initially envisioned.
 The SCO was founded in 1996 as the “Shanghai 
Five”, as a confidence building measure by the states 
that inherited the former U.S.S.R.-Chinese border 
(Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and China). 
This grouping was renamed the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization in 200131.  It was designed to manage 
relations along this partially demilitarized border. The 
actual negotiations on border delineation were car-
ried out on a bilateral basis, and were quite divisive, in 
Kazakhstan and even more so in Kyrgyzstan, where 
lands were ceded to Beijing. For its part the SCO has 
yet to fully define its organizational mission. Created as 
a security organization, there seems very little likelihood 
that its member states would ever pursue any sort of 
joint military action in times of conflict. Similarly, Russia 
in particular has sought to advance the organization as 
an economic coordinating body, especially in the area 
of energy. But this has not gotten strong support from 
any of the other members. Finally, the membership 
of the organization has yet to be permanently fixed. 
India, Mongolia, Iran and Pakistan are observers, and 
occasionally Russia has advanced the idea that Teheran 
should be invited to become a full member (a decision 
which can only be made consensually). To date, since 
the SCO’s formation only Uzbekistan has joined, and 
China is reported to be trying to keep the membership 
from expanding.   
Neither Russia nor China has made substantial 
use of the SCO to advance its interest in the region. 
China’s economic position in each of these countries 
has increased dramatically in the last five years, through 
Beijing’s investment in the oil and gas industry in 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and by 
China’s aggressive use of loans and grants to all five 
countries, especially during the recent global crisis.
Kyrgyzstan’s economists had hoped that their mem-
bership in the WTO (the only one of the Central Asian 









































nations to have gained membership) would turn them 
into China’s gateway to the rest of Central Asia. While 
this has certainly increased the volume of transit trade 
going through Kyrgyzstan, the advantage has diminished 
over time as Chinese businessmen have preferred to 
develop ties on a bilateral basis, and have found ways 
to make direct inroads in each of these countries, and 
finding enthusiastic local partners eager to trade with 
them. Goods from China dominate most of the whole-
sale markets in Central Asia, crowding out goods from 
Russia, and reducing the incentive for local entrepre-
neurs to invest in their countries’ own light industry sec-
tor. Similarly, investors from China are also moving into 
the light industry and service sector in several of these 
countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in par-
ticular), and in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan there is sub-
stantial concern that Chinese (Han) farmers are illegally 
establishing settlements especially in border regions32.   
But although Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Uzbek policy-makers 
and politicians all offer the same fears with regard to 
the risks relating to China’s economic “conquest” of the 
countries of the region, no regional organization has 
been strong enough or competent enough to try and 
regulate Beijing’s growing role.  
As already mentioned, the SCO’s role in the 
economy has largely been of a declarative nature. 
EurAsEc33  has yet to develop into an effective organiza-
tion. The Eurasian Development Bank, which enjoys 
an associated status with EurAsEc is undercapital-
ized, and although it has funded several cross-border 
projects, they have been of a relatively marginal char-
acter34.  Uzbekistan’s decision in 2008 to suspend its 
32  Throughout the 1990s Kazakhstan had an aggressive program designed 
to encourage the “return” of Kazakhs living beyond the country’s borders, especially the 
“Oralman” (Kazakhs living outside of the U.S.S.R., mostly in China), and it appears that 
thousands of Han somehow managed to come in under this program as well.
33  EurAsEc, the Eurasian Economic Community, was organized in 2000, 
by Russia,  Belarus, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan with the intent of creating a 
common economic space from these countries, through stages, by which common trade 
a tariff policies would be introduced, as well as joint economic projects and a joint foreign 
economic investment strategy. Uzbekistan joined EurAsEc in January 2005, at which time 
the Central Asian Cooperation organization was folded into it. Uzbekistan withdrew from 
the organization in October 2008.
34  The Eurasian Development Bank, was jointly organized by Russia and 
Kazakhstan, providing $1 billion and $500 million respectively in capital, and Tajikistan 
(adding $500,000) and Armenia ($100,000) joined in 2009. See, http://www.eabr.org/
eng/about/ and for a list of its projects see, http://www.eabr.org/rus/projects/portfolio/.
membership35  means that there is little hope that any 
sort of regional mechanism for strengthening the capac-
ity of the Central Asian countries to stimulate the devel-
opment of a regional market that would stimulate the 
development of local industries (in light industry and in 
the service sector most specifically) is unlikely in the near 
or medium term. When the customs union36  between 
Kazakhstan and Russia comes into existence in 2010, 
it will become even more difficult for EurAsEc to shape 
the terms of trade throughout the region. This customs 
union could also complicate efforts by CAREC37  to 
facilitate trade and transport across the region.
The SCO is not yet able to play an independent role 
in addressing the national security needs of its member 
nations (other than stabilizing relations in border regions). 
While the member states share a definition of what 
constitutes a security threat (terrorism, extremist and 
secession) they have done very little to combat them in 
concert.  There have been joint exercises, but there has 
been very little intelligence sharing, and most importantly 
there appears to be no likelihood of the SCO nations 
ever adopting anything like the degree of integration of 
command and control functions that are required for 
any sort of functional military bloc such as NATO or the 
CSTO.
NATO’s presence in the region has not proved to be 
particularly divisive (especially by comparison to that of 
the CSTO), but NATO’s presence has not helped to mini-
mize the competition between the Central Asian states. 
The pervasive attitude of non-cooperation effectively 
doomed CENTRASBAT38,  a U.S. led effort in the late 
35  There are various explanations for why Tashkent withdrew from EurAsEc, 
including that it was in response to the EU removal of sanctions against Uzbekistan. I give 
more credence to accounts that Uzbekistan wanted to better insulate its economy against 
the effect of the global financial crisis,  by eliminating preferential investment terms 
for Russian and Kazakh capital, particularly since both countries were sending home 
seasonal labor from Uzbekistan.
36  Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus are set to introduce a unified customs 
code in 2010, with the expectation being that most of the Kazakh and Russian tariffs will 
be unified by July 2010.
37  CAREC stands for Central Asian Regional Cooperation program of the 
Asian Development Bank, which focuses on improving economic cooperation of an eight 
state region through enhanced transportation links and technical assistance designed to 
enhance trade. These states are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 









































1990s to create a regional brigade (from Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) to intervene in the event of 
inter-ethnic conflicts, leaving NATO to concentrate on bi-
lateral measures to engage with the Central Asian states 
in projects involving reform of the security sector. The 
atmosphere of competition actually helped NATO get 
its second military base in the region; once Uzbekistan 
made the offer of Khanabad-Karsi, Kyrgyz president 
Askar Akayev became virtually desperate to get a similar 
facility placed in his country, so as not to risk changing 
the security balance in the region in Uzbekistan’s favor, 
although that had never been NATO’s intent.
To an outside observer it appears that Moscow’s 
efforts to advance a common security structure, in 
the form of the CSTO, have been executed in a way to 
increase competition in the region so as to enhance 
Russia’s ability to serve as stabilizer. Tashkent has been 
an “in and out” of the organization on two separate 
occasions. The CSTO was originally known as the 
Tashkent Security Cooperation, but Uzbekistan left 
the organization in 2002 in order to more closely ally 
itself with NATO, but rejoined in 2005 after the U.S. and 
EU sharply criticized Tashkent for refusing to hold an 
international inquiry into the civilian deaths in Andijan in 
May of that year39.  But as Uzbekistan’s relations with 
NATO began improving in 2008, pressure from Russia 
for closer military cooperation also increased, which 
Tashkent choose not to yield to. Moscow (whose annoy-
ance was likely heightened by the fact that it was contin-
uing to pay Tashkent better than market price for its gas 
that year, when other countries were pressed to renego-
tiate) announced that it would be opening a new military 
base and regional training center at Osh in Kyrgyzstan, 
right near the border with Uzbekistan. Tashkent, believ-
ing that this base could be used to send CSTO forces 
into Uzbekistan (at the behest of Kyrgyzstan or even 
38  See Global Security CENTRASBAT, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
ops/centrasbat.htm, and  for a discussion of NATO activities in Central Asia more gener-
ally see NATO “Partners in Central Asia,” http://www.nato.int/ebookshop/backgrounder/
partners_central_asia/partners_central_asia-e.pdf.
39  For a contemporaneous account see International Crisis Group Briefing, 
“Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising,” May 25, 2005, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/
documents/asia/central_asia/b038_uzbekistan___the_andijon_uprising_edited.pdf.
Tajikistan), then chose to become an “inactive” member 
of the CSTO,  and the Uzbek senate passed a resolution 
barring the deployment of Uzbek troops abroad, even 
for military exercises, which substantially limits Uzbek 
participation in the SCO as well.  
Turkmenistan is so distrustful of Russia finding any 
wedge to enhance its role in its economy that Ashgabat 
refused to join NATO’s northern supply route because 
it believed that these over land cargo caravans that 
originate in Russia would invariably be led by Russians 
and lead to Moscow gaining partial control of the freight 
traffic at Turkmenistan’s borders40.  Turkmenistan 
stopped shipping gas to Russia in April 200941,  after a 
mysterious explosion in their gas pipeline system, and 
has been able to compensate for this largely because 
of a large loan from China, who is effectively buying 
Turkmenistan’s gas forward.
Similarly, the perception that Russia has played the 
Caspian energy producers against one another, and 
generally ill-treated them is one of the contributing fac-
tors in the U.S. and EU support for the development of 
new east-west transport corridors that by-pass Russia. 
Obviously the distinction between the use of hegemonic 
power and aggressively pursuing commercial advantage 
almost always varies according to what is the advantage 
in the eye of the beholder.  But nonetheless, there is no 
question that the Central Asian states perceive them-
selves at a comparative disadvantage because of their 
relative lack of alternative pipeline routes, and they have 
never been able to effectively launch a common front 
against Russia.
There was some hope among the Central Asian 
states that Saparmurad Niyazov’s death would lead 
to growing cooperation among the three export gas 
producing states.  Nazarbayev tried to play the role 
of “big brother” to Gurbangoly Berdimuhammedov in 
the early days of his presidency, attending Niyazov’s 
40  Turkmenistan does allow for humanitarian air cargo for Afghanistan to land 
in the country and transit over land into Afghanistan.
41  Turkmen gas sales to Russia are set  to resume on January 10, 2010, at 
a reduced level of 30 bcm for the year, and to be purchased by Gazprom at European 









































funeral and offering the Turkmens government access 
to the expertise of the Kazakh government in the oil and 
gas sector, and assistance more broadly should they 
want it. Very little came of this strategy for a number of 
reasons. While the Kazakhs were able to develop some 
business interests in the country, including in the oil and 
gas sector and in banking, they were not able to craft 
for themselves something of a privileged position in 
Turkmenistan’s economy. Moreover, their enthusiasm for 
doing so was likely dampened after Russia’s invasion of 
Georgia which left Kazakhstan with billions of dollars of 
frozen investments42.  
Even though Uzbekistan’s relationship with Ashgabat 
improved, with an exchange of state visits, and a 
substantial lessening of tensions in the border regions 
between the two countries, the Uzbeks are not will-
ing to trust any of their energy interests to Ashgabad.  
Furthermore, Tashkent’s rivalry with Astana doomed 
Nazarbayev’s impulse from the onset. Added to this, 
though, was the fact that Russian President Putin has 
been a better games player, making various promises to 
try and gain the assent of both the Turkmen and Kazakh 
leaders to building a new gas pipeline which is to run 
along the Caspian coast, but then reneging on what the 
Kazakhs in particular believed were going to be Russian 
concessions on the CPC pipeline.  
In the end Turkmenistan’s leadership didn’t want to 
grow too close to any regional state, enjoying its relative 
isolation (aided by positive neutrality) and closed nature 
of the economy.  And China was just so much more an 
attractive partner than any Soviet-style machinations, 
given that Ashgabat doesn’t have a border with them.
Part of Russia’s strategy has been to play the Central 
Asian states off against each other, in order to maximize 
Gazprom’s bargaining advantage43.  The lack of trans-
parency in the gas industry’s of some of these country’s 
has helped facilitate this, allowing Gazprom to negotiate 




43  For Gazprom’s own account of its relations with the Central Asian countries 
see http://www.gazprom.com/production/central-asia/.
separate gas purchase prices from each, and to design 
wholly separate transit agreements. For example 
Gazprom buys Turkmen gas at the Uzbek border, but 
Uzbekistan handles the transit of its own gas, up to the 
Kyrgyz border where Gazprom buys it and sells it to the 
Kyrgyz, whom they promised (but did not deliver) lower 
purchase prices. Gazprom also manages the swap of 
Uzbek gas in southern Kazakhstan for Kazakh gas at 
the border to Russia. The Russians paid the Uzbeks 
higher than average in the region for gas purchases 
in 2008, because they agreed to co-finance repairs to 
part of the CAC pipeline system through the region, and 
then turned around and tried to press Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan into similar arrangements (unsuccessfully). 
But through all Russia’s machinations the Central Asian 
states have failed to develop even an informal coopera-
tive mechanism in their gas industries, preferring to keep 
their dealings with Moscow a secret. The distance is 
further preserved by the fact that in some countries the 
ruling families are either openly (Kazakhstan) or report-
edly (Uzbekistan) involved in the gas sector themselves.
China’s growing role in the region’s oil and gas 
sector could dramatically reduce Russia’s influence, 
far more than any existing or planned alternative west-
bound oil routes. Chinese investment in this sector dates 
from the mid-1990s in Kazakhstan and has dramatically 
expanded in the past five years44.  A new gas pipeline 
moving Turkmen gas eastward to China will open in 
December, 2008, and is slated to move 30 bcm of 
Turkmen gas across Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and China 
within the next five years, expanding to 40 bcm.  More 
importantly, China has loaned Turkmenistan $3 billion 
for gas field development that will help the country to 
offset losses from cutting off gas sales to Russia, and 
also used the financial crisis to bolster their position in 
Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector, where they now own 
more than a third of that country’s on-shore reserves.
China has also been quick to offer billions of dollars 
in lines of credit to the various Central Asian states, 
including providing major support for transport projects 








































in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, so that Beijing’s 
enhanced role in these two countries is as significant 
as it is in the oil and gas rich states.  It too has come 
into Afghanistan, buying that country’s largest mineral 
extraction project, helping insure an increasing role for 
China in greater Central Asia. Beijing has pursued its 
strategy almost entirely on a bi-lateral basis, supporting 
international initiatives like CAREC’s efforts at transport 
and trade facilitation because they advance China’s 
economic interests. But although Beijing has endorsed 
the idea of enhancing the role of the SCO in the eco-
nomic sector, but not doing anything practical to actually 
achieve this, quite possibly in part because that could 
provide a regional setting that could potentially moderate 
China’s influence, or at least balance it with Russia’s. 
 Many in the region fear that in the end the Central 
Asian states will find themselves as dependent on 
Beijing’s will as they have been on Moscow, and that 
they would be totally unable to pursue any sort of 
independent economic strategy if China and Russia 
were ever to develop any sort of energy consortium, or 
a deeper form of economic cooperation. While Central 
Asia’s leaders are growing increasingly more competent 
in managing relations with China (including through the 
inclusion of more Chinese speaking policymakers in top 
positions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in particular), 
this is a relationship which the Central Asian elite are less 
skilled at in general than they are in their relationships 
with Russia. All of Central Asia’s elite is still composed 
of fluent Russian speakers, and while not all served in 
Soviet-era party and state institutions, even the younger 
generation shares educational and other socializing 
experiences with the new generation of Russian elite, 
which is only true of a small percent of the elite and their 
Chinese counterparts. 
Looking Ahead: By Way of Conclusion
With every passing year the republics that all were a part 
of a common whole drift further and further apart. Each 
has been steadily developing its own identity and its own 
economy. This is an entirely normal process, and should 
surprise no one. Cross-border economic links that were 
solely artifacts of Kremlin policy-making have broken 
and new ones are being forged. In many cases they 
reflect market forces, but in other instances they are the 
product of rulers who continue to pursue state-directed 
economies. 
Geography still dictates many of the transportation 
and communication networks, with geopolitics add-
ing another set of restrictions. While the old road and 
rail routes across Russia still dominate commercial 
exchanges, new transport links have developed  that are 
joining up these countries with a broader swath of the 
global community.  While this is going more slowly than 
many had hoped, and even predicted, given security 
challenges of crossing Afghanistan and U.S. sanctions 
against Iran, it is obvious that the twenty-first century 
patterns of interaction between these countries will differ 
significantly from those of the nineteenth and twentieth 
century when Moscow’s interpretation of geography was 
all that counted.  
The differences between the Central Asian states are 
likely to be further cemented once the current generation 
of Soviet-era leaders passes from the scene.  From that 
time on the region’s elite will lack common socialization. 
They may even lack a common language in which to talk 
among themselves. The elites who come to power will 
be ruling populations who have been taught highly eth-
nocentric versions of their national histories’ and now are 
accustomed to view their neighbors with distrust.  With 
every passing year the Soviet-era flow of people and 
goods across republic boundaries becomes ever more 
distant, and the ties of separated families and of a com-
mon linguistic heritage increasingly more attenuated.
This will change the tone of interaction between 
these states, and could well normalize it.  Relations may 
well improve between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and 
possibly even between Uzbekistan and both Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan.  While they may find the precedent of 
competition rather than cooperation is already well 









































to be a deciding factor in whether regional economic 
projects are seen in a new light.  
There are too many intangibles to offer anything but 
the vaguest predictions. Should Uzbekistan deregulate 
its economy, new cross border economic linkages 
would quickly develop; if Kazakhstan’s economy 
resumes growth at anything like pre-2008 rates then 
Astana and Kazakh capital could play a major role in 
creating economically sustainable links with Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan; if the customs union between Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus prospers, it too could serve 
as a major force for greater economic integration with 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as well; China has the finan-
cial capacity to greatly expand its presence in the region, 
in ways that dictate the structure of the economies of the 
region. 
At the same time the triggers for conflict will still 
remain, and the conditions associated with climate 
change create new and enhanced risks for their exacer-
bation. But the breakdown of old economic patterns and 
economic interactions give hope that regional competi-
tions will not become the basis of armed conflict in the 
future.  While there is certainly cause for pessimism 
there is also reason for hope, and maybe worsening 
climatic conditions will finally serve as a spur for further 









































Source: Malise Ruthven and Azim Nanji, Historical Atlas of the Islamic World (Cartographica, 2005), pp. 41.




Source: Malise Ruthven and Azim Nanji, Historical Atlas of the Islamic World (Cartographica, 2005), pp. 95.













































Source: Malise Ruthven and Azim Nanji, Historical Atlas of the Islamic World (Cartographica, 2005), pp. 105.
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Source: MU.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Muslim Peoples in the Soviet Union, 1981, https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/soviet_muslim_peoples.jpg, 
(accessed November 23, 2009).












































  Tajik Enclaves in Kyrgyzstan
  Tajik Enclave in Uzbekistan
  Kyrgyz Enclave in Uzbekistan
  Uzbek Enclaves in Kyrgyzstan
Source: Rob Robinson, “Enclaves of the World,” http://enclaves.webs.com/centralasia.htm (accessed November 23, 2009).




















































Source: “CAREC Transport and Trade Facilitation: A Partnership for Prosperity,” (Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank), 2009, http://www.adb.org/Documents/
Reports/Carec-Transpo-Trade-Facilitation/CAREC-Transpo-Trade-Facilitation.pdf, pp. 8.
Transportation











































Source: Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government, Energy Information Association, “Kazakhstan- Maps and Tables,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/
Kazakhstan/MapsTable.html, (accessed November 24, 2009).
Oil and Gas Pipelines
Proposed and Existing Natural Gas Pipelines
Appendix 
D
Source: Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government, Energy Information Association, “Kazakhstan- Maps and Tables,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/
Kazakhstan/MapsTable.html, (accessed November 24, 2009).
Oil and Gas Pipelines










































Source: Raghuveer Sharma, Anil Markandya, Masood Ahmad, Marat Iskakov and Venkataraman Krishnaswamy, “Water Energy Nexus in Central Asia Improving Regional 
Cooperation in the Syr Darya Basin,” (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, Europe and Central Asia Region), January 2004, pp. 2.
Cascades and Hydropower Reservoirs
Main Reservoirs and Hydropower Facilities of the Syr Darya Basin
Appendix 
E
Source: Raghuveer Sharma, Anil Markandya, Masood Ahmad, Marat Iskakov and Venkataraman Krishnaswamy, “Water Energy Nexus in Central Asia Improving Regional 
Cooperation in the Syr Darya Basin,” (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, Europe and Central Asia Region), January 2004, pp. 23.
Cascades and Hydropower Reservoirs











































Source: Raghuveer Sharma, Anil Markandya, Masood Ahmad, Marat Iskakov and Venkataraman Krishnaswamy, “Water Energy Nexus in Central Asia Improving Regional 
Cooperation in the Syr Darya Basin,” (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, Europe and Central Asia Region), January 2004, pp. 35.




Power Regime (low summer and 
higher winter discharges
Irrigation Regime (higher summer 
and restricted winter discharges
Costs to Kyrgyz Republic (millions)  $13.4 $48.5
Benefits to Uzbekistan (millions) $10.5 $46.3
Benefits to Kazakhstan (millions) $8.4 $39.9
Sub Total of Benefits (millions) $18.9 $86.2
Net Basin Benefit (millions) $5.5 $37.7
Data Source: Raghuveer Sharma, Anil Markandya, Masood Ahmad, Marat Iskakov and Venkataraman Krishnaswamy, “Water Energy Nexus in Central Asia Improving Regional Cooperation in the Syr 
Darya Basin,” (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, Europe and Central Asia Region), January 2004, pp. v. 
Cost Analysis of Power versus Irrigation Regime















































1992 Aral Sea Basin Water Allocation and Management 
(including Syr Darya but not Afghanistan); 1993 Aral 
Sea Basin Program and 1994 Nukus Declaration on Aral 
Sea Basin Management (including Syr Darya but not 
Afghanistan); 1999 Revised Mandate of the International 
Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (including Syr Darya but not 
Afghanistan)
Chui and Talas Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 2002 Kazakh-Kyrgyz Preliminary Agreement for Joint 
Use and Management 
Ili-Balkash Kazakhstan, People’s Republic of 
China
2003 Kazakh-Chinese Preliminary Agreement for Joint 
Use and Management 
Irtysh Kazakhstan, People’s Republic of 
China, Russian Federation
1992 Kazakh-Russian Joint Use and Protection of 
Transboundary Waters (covers Ishim, Irtysh, Ural, Tobol 
and Volga); 2003 Kazakh-Chinese Preliminary Agreement 
for Joint Use and Management
Ishim Kazakhstan, Russian Federation
1992 Kazakh-Russian Joint Use and Protection of 
Transboundary Waters (covers Ishim, Irtysh, Ural, Tobol 
and Volga)
Syr Darya Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan
1992 Aral Sea Basin Water Allocation and Management 
(including Amu Darya); 1993 Aral Sea Basin Program and 
1994 Nukus Declaration on Aral Sea Basin Management 
(including Amu Darya); 1998 Framework Agreement on 
Rational Water and Energy Use; 1999 Revised Mandate 
of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea
Tobol Kazakhstan, Russian Federation
1992 Kazakh-Russian Joint Use and Protection of 
Transboundary Waters (covers Ishim, Irtysh, Ural, Tobol 
and Volga)
Ural Kazakhstan, Russian Federation
1992 Kazakh-Russian Joint Use and Protection of 
Transboundary Waters (covers Ishim, Irtysh, Ural, Tobol 
and Volga)
Volga Kazakhstan, Russian Federation
1992 Kazakh-Russian Joint Use and Protection of 
Transboundary Waters (covers Ishim, Irtysh, Ural, Tobol 
and Volga)
Source: “Strategy and Project Activities to Support Improved Regional Water Management in Central Asia,” (United Nations Development Programme), July 2004, pp. 26.
Management Agreements in the Major Transboundary River Basins in Central Asia
Appendix 
GThe Emerging Markets Forum was created by the Centennial Group as a not-for-pro￿t 
initiative to bring together high-level government and corporate leaders from around the 
world to engage in dialogue on the key economic, ￿nancial and social issues facing 
emerging market countries.
 
The Forum is focused on some 70 emerging market economies in East and South Asia, 
Eurasia, Latin America and Africa that share prospects of superior economic performance, 
already have or seek to create a conducive business environment and are of near-term 
interest to private investors, both domestic and international. Our current list of EMCs is 
shown on the back cover. We expect this list to eveolve over time, as countries’ policies and 
prospects change.      
Further details on the Forum and its meetings may be seen on our website at http://www.emergingmarketsforum.org
The Watergate O￿ce Building, 2600 Virginia Avenue, NW, Suite 201
Washington, DC 20037, USA.  Tel:(1) 202 393 6663  Fax: (1) 202 393 6556
Email: info@emergingmarketsforum.org 
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